OPINION — Russia was once a proud supplier of weapons to a growing China. However, over the past few years that paradigm has shifted and that relationship has changed.
In 2017, SIPRI reported that by 2015 Russia had sold roughly US $60 billion in weapons to China since the early 1990s (adjusted to 2015 dollars). One example was an arms deal that was signed in November 2015 in which Russia sold 24 Su‑35 fighters and 4 S‑400 SAM systems to China for about US $7 billion.
Now, Russia is dealing with “wounds” inflicted by its former protégé, the PRC. From the Sukhoi Su-27 fighter, now known as the J-11, to drones and other important air defense systems, China has made Russia dependent on Chinese technology (especially in the domain of drones). For example:
- The Garpiya drones assembled by Russia are powered by Chinese engines (Xiamen Limbach-based) and Chinese components, effectively substituting Russian supply chains.
- In the Aero-HIT factory near Khabarovsk, Russia is producing large numbers of Veles FPV drones—a drone built on the Chinese Autel EVO Max 4T design—with Chinese cooperation, bypassing Russian domestic models.
The result is telling: by 2024 Russian arms exports accounted for less than 5% of the world market, severely down from the 30% share in 2012. China has overtaken Russian markets and is now competing with, and beating, Moscow in sales to multiple countries, in places such as Latin America, Africa and Southeast Asia, where Beijing is seeking to expand influence.
In sensitive areas like electronic warfare and missile propulsion, Russia remains a credible and strong seller of equipment. However, it is increasingly losing its dominant position in sales to countries not supplied by the U.S.
This decline stems from China’s spectacular progress in AI, microelectronics, and quantum computing, something Russia is unable to compete with. This has led to a situation where China effectively holds the upper hand. Specifically:
- The international sanctions imposed after the invasion of Ukraine have created a national security risk for Moscow because Russian companies, both state and privately-owned, now depend heavily on Chinese technology to complete their designs.
- Chinese firms provide over 70% of Russia’s imports of microchips and other components, with many operating without a clear status, often hidden in complex supply chains.
It is safe to say that Moscow’s defense production being fueled by this reliance on Beijing probably worries Putin’s advisors.
In addition, banned items that are necessary to maintain Russia’s military’s functionality, including optical systems, drones, semiconductors, and machine tools, are now being transported through China to Russia. Estimates show that up to 90% of all dual use banned items that Russia needs are coming from Chinese intermediaries.
A silver lining to this is that Chinese banks have recently begun to examine transactions more closely, freezing Russian dealings due to fears of U.S. sanctions.
Additionally, Chinese businesses have started limiting shipments due to U.S.-led threats of secondary sanctions against supporters of Russia’s war machine. This gives the U.S. a chance to monitor the PRC’s support to Moscow and call Beijing out on it at UN meetings or in demarches.
This is more likely than not to negatively affect Russia, as it forces Putin’s government to look for, and rely on, intermediaries at higher prices.
The above is one example of the complicated nature of the Sino-Russian relationship which can be described as both essential and parasitic.
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Through coordinated operations like “Northern United,” Arctic naval patrols, and missile warning partnerships, Russia and China appear to be working in synch on these undertakings.
However, these actions do not necessarily signify a unified command structure between the two nations on any significant battlefield, either low or high intensity ones.
In the meantime, China remains ambiguous – at least in public – about the idea of sending arms to Russia and it is notable that they have not recognized the latter’s annexation of Ukrainian territory. At the same time, the PRC doesn’t mind the Russo-Ukrainian war, as it no doubt provides useful insight to China as far as Russian military strategy goes.
It also shouldn’t come as a surprise that those lessons learned could – and probably do – aid the PRC in adjusting and getting acquainted with how Western military equipment is being put in use in the field. This is especially important in terms of U.S.- made land-based, medium and long range missile launch systems currently in use (or with the potential to be used like the Tomahawk missile) in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict.
Beijing military planners no doubt are already taking into account the ramifications of the use of these systems by Taiwan as a deterrent or even in an actual conflict against China. Many of those platforms are already being deployed in the region.
Western analysts often talk about the “Axis of Autocracy,” which includes Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. Yet, it is important to note that the Sino-Russian ‘alliance’ is far from being unified.
Beijing, worried about possible economic problems, appears to be trying to manage a liability that has been hoisted on them by the Kremlin, while Moscow seeks a geopolitical lifeline. China is playing a long game, gaining an advantage, avoiding sanctions, and acquiring technology, while Moscow struggles to limit Western isolation.
As in everything the PRC government does, China’s aim is dominance rather than partnership. This means that Beijing’s concern will grow as Russia becomes more dependent on them. Once China has harvested everything it can – such as engine technology, battlefield data, and a foothold in the Arctic – it can then easily abandon their ‘alliance’.
Russian officials and informed citizens will see problems with China’s not-so-secret purchases of shares in Russian energy companies, or its demands for discounts from Russia on oil and gas sales. In addition, an influx of Chinese consumer and surveillance technology make this relationship resemble a form of soft colonization.
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Moscow’s elite have historically focused their efforts to thwart NATO and the West, both militarily and politically. But now, it is likely that Moscow is also concerned about Russian sovereignty vis-à-vis China. Their fear is that a future tied to a Sino-Russian cooperation borne out of necessity rather than a mutual partnership could threaten Russian sovereignty. And it is not an unwarranted fear.
Moreover, Russian technocrats are privately concerned about possible ramifications. One Russian insider remarked as far back as 2016 that: “We are giving them (the Chinese) the crown jewels,” referring to radar and missile technologies being sold to or provided to China. There is an increasing feeling in the Kremlin that this is not a mutually beneficial relationship.
In other words, the appearance of a “no-limits” partnership has turned into a cruel joke that highlights both China’s and Russia’s own red-lines. As the London Times recently noted, “China is beginning to see Russia as a bad bet”.
It is becoming increasingly evident that we are approaching a point where the Kremlin will have to decide about the future of this relationship. This analysis has highlighted the military and economic consequences placed upon Russia by an over-reliance on China in terms of:
- Sales of military hardware for Russian systems by Beijing
- China’s purchases of Russian oil and gas, as a lifeline to Moscow
- China’s own ambitions in the global market of sales of military equipment
- The fact that Russia is de-facto the weaker partner in this relationship, based on the evidence presented
The consequences of whether this ‘alliance’ between the two countries has a future or whether it will fizzle out are far-reaching and extend beyond Russia and China. They will most assuredly define and/or force the U.S. to adapt its strategy in the European theater of operations, their calls for a major European rearmament undertaking and their strategy in the Indo-Pacific.
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